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The paper develops a theoretical framework of heterogeneous consumers and producers 
to examine the market and welfare effects of the introduction of variety-level genetic use 
restriction technologies (V-GURTs) under the current No-Labeling regime of GMPs in 
the US market. Specifically, the study examines how the agronomic characteristics of 
GURTs, consumer perceptions and preferences regarding interventions in the production 
process (i.e., genetic modification) and producer cost structures (e.g., dependency on 
saving seed) affect the adoption of the technology by producers, the market acceptance of 
GURTs by consumers and consequently the innovator’s incentive to introduce the new 
technology.  Analytical results show that the introduction of GURTs may be welfare 
enhancing for consumers, producers and innovating firms when consumer aversion to 
GURTs is low, the agronomic benefits of the GURTs crop are high, and the expected 
penalty producers face when they cheat on their GM licensing agreements (e.g., due to 
inefficient or costly monitoring) is low. 
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An intellectual property rights (IPRs) system is effective when infringers can be 
identified, successfully sued for damages and deterred from further infringement. The 
effectiveness of IPRs in plant varieties is limited due to the high detection costs of 
unauthorized use of seed that embodies intellectual property and high enforcement costs. 
There are two types of seed delivery systems, the formal regulated seed supply system, 
and the farmers’ own seed supply system. Globally, the largest quantity of seed is 
produced by the farmers themselves; more than 75% of farmers, mainly farmers in 
developing countries, depend on saved seed as their primary seed source (RAFI, 2004).
1 
Given that farmers are spread all over and seed reproduces naturally, monitoring the use 
of seed by farmers becomes very costly making the unauthorized use of seed a serious 
problem for seed providers. As a consequence, seed companies perform limited research 
and development (R&D) in self-pollinating plants mainly because seed saving limits their 
ability to recoup their investment. 
The use of variety level genetic use restriction technologies (V-GURTs) is a 
biological way of restricting the unauthorized use of seed that embodies intellectual 
property that could be used by innovators/breeders to restrict farmers and competing 
breeders from reproducing their innovations. Specifically, V-GURTs, which are 
commonly referred to as terminator technology, are technologies that can restrict the use 
of the entire variety through interference with reproduction resulting in the production of 
                                                           
1 In India, for instance, 83% of farmers use their own farm-saved seeds (Sharma 2005). Even in developed 
countries farmers rely on saving seed. By some estimates, 20-30% of all soybean fields in the US, in the 
Midwest and up to 50% of soybeans in the South are planted with farm-saved seeds (Taylor 1996) while 
according to other estimates, most North American wheat farmers typically rely on farm-saved seeds and 
return to the commercial market once every 4 years (ETC 1998). The percentage of farm-saved seed for 
UK is 30%, for Germany 46%, for France 35%, for Portugal 75%, for Spain 88% (Toledo 2002).   
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sterile seeds.
2 Terminator technology could work more effectively than other IPR regimes 
(e.g., patents, breeder’s rights or licenses) as an innovation rent appropriation mechanism 
for innovators/breeders because it makes it impossible for farmers to save and re-use 
seed.  As a consequence, the introduction of GURTs might encourage innovating firms to 
invest more in R&D, especially in self-pollinating crops where hybrids are not effective 
(e.g., rice, wheat, soybean, cotton). More than fifty GURTs patents have been issued to 
date, nineteen of which relate to V-GURTs/terminator technology and are held by private 
firms, universities and the US Government (Pendleton 2004).
3  
Even though GURTs have not been commercialized yet, their potential 
introduction incites great controversy. The proponents of the GURTs technology claim 
that its introduction will strengthen the protection of intellectual property, will result in 
increased agricultural productivity through an increased degree of accuracy in production 
(e.g., precision agriculture) and in crops with better agro-ecological characteristics, could 
be used as a tool that prevents the escape of horizontal gene flow into neighboring crops 
or wild species, limiting the potential negative environmental effects of genetically 
modified (GM) crops (as the long-term effects of GM plants are not known) and could be 
viewed as a lever to encourage countries to provide greater IP protection to GM crops.
4  
  On the other hand, a number of countries (e.g., India), consumer groups and non-
                                                           
2 On the other hand, T-GURTs are technologies that can restrict the use of a specific trait by regulating its 
expression. That is, one or more genes conferring a single trait are switched on or off through specific 
chemical inducers. The seed itself remains viable, but farmers need to buy the inducers to be able to take 
advantage of the specific trait.  
3 The first patent on GURTs was granted to Delta and Pine Land Co and the US Department of Agriculture 
in March 1998 (US patent 5,723,765, on the “Control of Plant Gene Expression”). This patent describes “a 
set of interacting genetic elements that allows the controlled expression of value-added trait or of seed 
viability in a crop plant” (Visser et al. 2001, p. 9). While current patent applications apply to plants, 
GURTs could be built into any organism (e.g., farm animals, fish and trees) (Visser et al. 2001). 
4 For instance, biotech companies can threaten to introduce terminator technology if a country does not 
improve its IPRs protection. In this case, a country that chooses to ban the technology looses the right to 
use the potentially valuable protected trait (Pendleton 2004).    
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governmental organizations oppose the introduction of GURTs.
5 The main argument of 
the opponents of terminator technology is that it is an unethical technology that deprives 
farmers of their traditional right to effectively save, use, and exchange seeds, which is the 
foundation of independence and food security for poor and small farmers. In addition, 
critics are concerned about the environmental effects of gene flow from crops which are 
sterilized and could, thus, sterilize other plants and have serious effects on the ecosystem 
(Jefferson 1999; Crouch 1998).
6 The opponents of the terminator technology also claim 
that it would restrict access to genetic resources and hinder the efforts of public 
institutions and farmers to make new discoveries through breeding, as terminator seeds 
produce sterile seeds and would, thus, affect the innovative potential of small and 
medium enterprises, increasing the barriers between public and private gene pools, which 
could imply less innovation in the long run. Related to this last concern is the concern 
that terminator technology will create perpetual monopolies which would lead to the 
unequal distribution of economic rents between farmers, seed companies and consumers 
(Shinivasan and Thirtle 1999). Finally, there is concern that the introduction of terminator 
technology will lead to an increase in both horizontal concentration and vertical 
integration (between the seed breeding and agrochemical sectors) creating monopolies in 
agricultural R&D and a displacement of investment may occur away from 
biotechnological options that might be more beneficial to farmers in developing 
countries. 
An ex-ante economic and/or ecological/environmental analysis of the impact of 
                                                           
5 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) pledged never to use any kind of 
terminator technology seeds and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is against the 
use of terminator technology (Pendleton 2004). 
6 Thus, even those farmers who reject the use of GURTs might be affected by its introduction as the fertility 
of their seeds could be affected by the gene flows from GURTs.  
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the introduction of terminator technology is a formidable task. The majority of the 
existing studies focus on the potential impacts of GURTs from an environmental, 
biosafety and moral point of view and discuss the possible welfare effects of the 
technology for farmers, firms and the society in a heuristic way (Visser et al. 2001; Gary 
2002; Eaton et al. 2002; Pendleton 2004). Another group of empirical studies uses data 
from the introduction of hybrid technology that shares some degree of use restriction with 
V-GURTs to make inferences about its potential economic effects (Swanson and Goeschl 
2000, 2002c; Goeschl and Swanson 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Srinivasan and Thirtle 
2000, 2002, 2003).
7 The above studies shows that hybridization enabled seed companies 
to capture greater profits and has attracted more private investment into plant breeding 
which could also occur  in the case of GURTs (Srinivasan and Thirtle 2000; 2002; 2003).  
Even though the above studies have shed some light into understanding the 
potential benefits and costs associated with GURTs, very few studies have developed a 
formal analytical framework to examine the economic effects of GURTs. Lence et al. 
(2005) estimate the impact of changes in the strength of the IPR regime on the welfare of 
consumers, producers and the R&D sector, without explicitly considering the case of 
GURTs; instead the study assumes that the introduction of GURTs is similar to a case 
where infinite IPR protection is granted. Burton et al. (2005) use a two-period principal-
agent model to examine the property rights protection of GM crops and compare sterile 
GM seed to short and long term contracts between seed producers and farmers in terms of 
their efficiency in protecting IPRs. Finally, Ambec et al. (2005) develop a two-period 
                                                           
7 Hybridization can be viewed as a weaker version of GURTs where the germplasm remains available to 
farmers and competing breeders for further breeding but where the crops grown from saved seed do not 
exhibit the desirable features of the initial seed (the loss from replanting hybrids is generally 25-30%, while 
the expected yield loss from using GURTs seeds is 100%).   
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model that studies the impact of crop trait durability on pricing strategies, switching 
decisions and self-production and focus on inefficiencies due to market power and the 
seed’s ability to self-produce.  
This study extends the existing literature by developing an analytical framework 
of heterogeneous consumers and producers to examine the potential market and welfare 
effects of the introduction of GURTs for the innovator of the new technology, producers, 
and the consumers of the final good. Specifically, the study examines how the agronomic 
characteristics of GURTs (relative to 1
st generation, producer-oriented GM and 
conventional products), consumer perceptions and preferences regarding interventions in 
the production process (i.e., genetic modification) and producer cost structures (e.g., 
dependency on saving seed) affect the adoption of the technology by producers, the 
market acceptance of GURTs by consumers and, consequently, the innovator’s incentive 
to introduce the new technology. The analysis analyzes the market effects of the 
introduction of GURTs under the current No-Labeling regime of GMPs in the US. The 
market outcomes from the introduction of GURTs are compared to the status quo where 
GURTs are not present in the market. 
Analytical results show that the consumer welfare effects of the introduction of 
GURTs depend on a number of factors such as the production share of GURTs in the total 
production of the non-labeled product, consumer aversion to GURTs relative to their 
aversion to GMPs and the relative product prices before and after the introduction of 
GURTs. In general, the lower is the price of the product produced with GURTs and the 
smaller is its production share in the total production of the non-labeled product, the more 
likely it is that the introduction of GURTs will lead to welfare gains for consumers with  
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low levels of aversion to genetic modification and the lower are the welfare losses for 
consumers with high levels of aversion to genetic modification. The producer welfare 
effects of the introduction of GURTs depend on the relative product and seed prices 
before and after the introduction of GURTs, the agronomic benefits of the GURTs seed 
over the GM seed, producers’ ability to save seed and the expected penalty producers face 
when they cheat on their GM seed licensing agreements. Specifically, the greater are the 
agronomic benefits of the GURTs crop, the higher is the price of the non-labeled product 
and the lower is the GURTs seed price, the greater are the welfare gains of the 
introduction of GURTs for producers with low dependency on saving seed and the more 
likely it is that producers with relatively high dependency on saving seed will find it 
profitable to switch their production from the conventional and the GM crop to the 
GURTs crop. Finally, the results show that the lower is consumer aversion to genetic 
modification and the lower is the expected penalty producers face when they cheat on 
their GM licensing agreements (e.g., due to inefficient or costly monitoring), the greater 
is the incentive of the seed company to introduce the GURTs technology as the greater 
are the profits that can be captured by the innovating firm.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the 
heterogeneous consumer and producer models, presents the market outcome and the 
decisions of the innovating firm, followed by section three where the welfare analysis is 
carried out. Section four concludes the study and makes suggestion for future research.  
2.  Market Effects of the Introduction of V-GURTs 
The model developed is based on the analytical framework introduced by Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) who study the market decisions and welfare of consumers, producers  
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and life science companies under different labeling regimes for GM products. The current 
model assumes that the available products in the market are vertically differentiated, that 
is, if all products are offered in the market at the same price, only one product – the 
product that is perceived as the high quality product – will have a positive market share.  
The players in this model are: 
•  consumers who are concerned about interventions in the production process and may 
differ in their willingness to pay for GURTs versus GM and conventional food 
products;  
•  producers who differ with respect to their location, agricultural conditions, skills and 
experience, production costs, size and dependency on saving seed;  
•  a firm/monopolist who has invented GURTs and is introducing GURTs seed into the 
market. 
The model assumptions concerning consumer perceptions and preferences regarding 
GURTs, producer heterogeneity with respect to costs of production and their dependency 
on saving seed, the agronomic effects of GURTs, and the characteristics of the innovating 
firm that introduces GURTs seed into the market are discussed in the sections that follow. 
The analysis considers two cases: the status quo where GURTs are not present in the 
market and the case where GURTs are introduced. 
2.1  Consumer purchasing decisions 
This study explicitly accounts for differences in consumer preferences regarding their 
aversion to interventions in the production process of GM, GURTs, and conventional 
food products. To capture the difference in consumers’ attitudes towards GM and GURTs 
products, consumers are assumed to differ in the utility they receive from the  
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consumption of GM and GURTs products and, thus, in their willingness to pay for these 
products. This consumer heterogeneity in terms of preferences for different food products 
is important in explaining the possible coexistence of markets for products produced 
through different production processes (Giannakas and Fulton 2002).  
The market examined consists of a product which could become available in a 
conventional, a GM, and a GURTs form as well as of a substitute to the above products. 
Consumers cannot detect certain product qualities by either search or experience in 
consumption. The differentiating attribute among the different forms of the final products 
is the process through which the products are produced which is a credence attribute. 
Since the physical characteristics of the different types of products are indistinguishable, 
consumers have to rely on labels for informed consumption decisions.  
As consumers are concerned about the health and environmental effects of genetic 
modification, it is assumed that they are averse to interventions in the production process 
and that the greater is the degree of the intervention in the production process of a given 
product, the greater is the utility discount received by consumers from the consumption 
of this product. It follows then that consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for the products available in the market. Based on the above, if the prices of the 
conventional, the GM, and the GURTs products were the same, and consumers could 
differentiate between these products, then all consumers would buy the conventional 
product. So the coexistence of markets for products produced through different 
production processes is the result of differences in product prices and differences in 
consumers’ WTP for the process attributes. The differences in consumers’ WTP for 
products are very important in understanding how GM, conventional and substitute  
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demands exist and how consumers react to the introduction of GURTs. Consumers may 
differ in their willingness to pay because of differences in their income, age, education, 
geographical location, among other factors. To be able to analyze consumers’ purchasing 
decisions we need to determine the utility derived by consumers from the consumption of 
the products available in the market.  
In the market considered here consumers are heterogeneous, uniformly distributed 
in the interval[] 1 , 0 . Thus, consumers are differentiated with respect to a characteristic c, 
where [] 1 , 0 ∈ c . Each consumer buys one unit of the type of product they prefer and this 
purchasing decision represents a small share of their budget. 
Consumers’ utility function is given by equation (1): 
c c p U U − =             if a unit of conventional product is consumed 
(1)  c p U U gm gm λ − − =          if a unit of GM product is consumed 
c p U U gurt gurt µ − − =        if a unit of GURTs product is consumed, and 
s s p U U − =                                if a unit of a substitute product is consumed 
where  c U ,  gm U ,  gurt U  and  s U  are, respectively, the utilities derived from the 
consumption of one unit of the conventional, the GM, the GURTs, and the substitute 
product, respectively. The parameter U  is a base level of utility associated with the 
physical characteristics of the product and, therefore, is the same for all four types of 
products. The parameters  c p ,  gm p ,  gurt p , and  s p  represent the market prices of the 
conventional, the GM, the GURT, and the substitute products, respectively. The 
parameters λ  and µ  are non-negative utility discount factors that are constant across 
consumers and along with the parameter c determine consumers’ level of aversion to  
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interventions in the production process. The greater are those parameters the higher is the 
aversion of consumers to interventions in the production process; if  0 = λ  or  0 = µ  then 
consumers would be indifferent between the types of products when these products are 
sold at the same price. The characteristic c differs across consumers and, as was 
mentioned earlier, it captures consumers’ aversion towards intervention in the production 
process and, thus, their WTP for the products available. As  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ c , those consumers 
who have larger values of c prefer the conventional product rather than the GM or the 
GURTs product, all else equal. The terms  c λ  and  c µ  give the discount in the level of 
utility from the consumption of the GM and the GURTs product, respectively. It is 
assumed that consumers’ aversion towards GURTs is at least as high as their aversion 
towards GMPs, i.e.,  λ µ ≥ . This assumption is introduced to capture expressed consumer 
concerns about the inability of producers to save and replant seed (ETC group 1998; 
2003; Pendleton 2004). Thus, if consumers view GURTs as any other GM product then 
µ λ = , while if they are concerned about producers’ inability to save seed then µ λ > .  
  Consumers are making decisions as to which product to buy based on the 
relative utilities associated with the consumption of the four products. This depends on 
the base utility, on the price of the products, and on their level of aversion to genetic 
modification.  
Status Quo 
Before the introduction of GURTs, the market consists of a GM, a conventional, and a 
substitute product. Considering the current situation in the US market, it is assumed that 
the GM and the conventional product are marketed together as a non-labeled product. 
Thus, consumers face two products: the non-labeled product (which consists of the GM  
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and the conventional products) and the substitute product. Because the GM and the 
conventional products are marketed together, the market price is the same for both 
products and is denoted by  nl p . Assume that there is a probability denoted by ψ  that the 
non-labeled product purchased by a consumer is GM, and probability of () ψ − 1  that the 
non-labeled product is conventional. It is assumed that consumers have rational 
expectations so that ψ  represents the production share of the GM product in the total 
production of the non-labeled product. Consumer utility derived from the consumption of 
the non-labeled product is then given by:  
(2)  c p U U U U U nl nl c gm nl ψλ ψ ψ − − = ⇒ − + = ) 1 (.  
Thus,  nl U  is the expected utility associated with the consumption of the non-labeled 
product and represents a weighted average of the utilities derived from the consumption 
of the GM and the conventional products. A consumer chooses which product to buy by 
comparing the utilities they get from purchasing the non-labeled and the substitute 
product. The consumer with characteristics 
ψλ
nl s
nl s nl nl
p p
c U U c
−
= ⇒ = ˆ : ˆ  is indifferent 
between consuming the non-labeled product and the substitute product, since the utility 
derived from the consumption of these products is the same.  
Figure 1 shows that consumers with  [ ) nl c c ˆ , 0 ∈  will consume the non-labeled 
product, and those with  ( ] 1 , ˆnl c c∈  will consume the substitute product. When consumers 
are uniformly distributed with respect to their aversion to interventions in production 
process,  nl c ˆ  determines the market share of the non-labeled product, denoted by  nl s . By 
normalizing the mass of consumers to one,  nl s  gives the consumer demand for the non- 
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= = ˆ . 
Equation (3) indicates that for the non-labeled product to capture a positive market share 
it should be priced below the substitute product.  
The inverse demand for the non-labeled product is then: 
(4)      nl s nl s p p ψλ − = .  
The demand for the substitute product is given by: 







− =1  
from which the inverse form can be derived: 
(6)     s nl s s p p ψλ ψλ − + = . 
 
nl U
s U  
nl c ˆ 0 1
ψλ  
s p U −
Consumer 
Utility 
nl p U −  
Differentiating consumer attribute, c 
Figure 1. Consumption decisions before the introduction of GURTs.  
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After the introduction of GURTs 
After the introduction of GURTs, the GURTs, GM and conventional products are 
marketed together as a non-labeled product.
 Thus, the analysis examines the general case 
where after the introduction of GURTs, the GM and the conventional product will 
continue to be supplied in the market. Other possible outcomes are analyzed as special 
cases. Given that GURTs are genetically modified products that also result in seed 
sterility and consumers are averse to the process of genetic modification, it is assumed 
that GURTs producers, like GM producers, will not have an incentive to voluntarily label 
their product. Thus, after the introduction of GURTs consumers face two products: the 
non-labeled product (which now consists of the GURTs, the GM, and the conventional 
products) priced at 
G
nl p  and the substitute product, priced at  s p . Assume that there is a 
probability denoted by θ  that the non-labeled product purchased by consumers is 
GURTs; a probability denoted by α  that the non-labeled product purchased is GM (but 
not GURTs), and a probability of  ) 1 ( α θ − −  that the non-labeled product purchased is 
conventional. The consumer utility derived from the consumption of the non-labeled 
product after the introduction of GURTs is now given by: 




nl c gm gurt
G
nl ) ( ) 1 ( αλ θµ α θ α θ + − − = ⇒ − − + + = .   











c U U c ˆ : ˆ  is indifferent 
between consuming the non-labeled and the substitute product, because the utility derived 
from the consumption of these products is the same. Consumers with  [ )
G
nl c c ˆ , 0 ∈  will 
consume the non-labeled product, and those with  ( ] 1 , ˆ
G
nl c c∈  will consume the substitute 
product. This outcome is depicted in Figure 2. Since consumers are uniformly distributed  
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with respect to their aversion to interventions in the production process, 
G
nl c ˆ  also 
determines the market share of the non-labeled product, denoted by 
G
nl s  which, as 
previously discussed, also gives the consumer demand for the non-labeled product: 









c s ˆ .  
Given the above, for the non-labeled product to have a positive market share, its price 
should be below the price of the substitute product.  





nl s p p ) ( αλ θµ + − = . 
The demand for the substitute product is given by: 
(10)  () αλ θµ +
−







s s 1 1  





nl s s p p ) ( ) ( αλ θµ αλ θµ + − + + = .  
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2.2  Producer production decisions 
This study also explicitly accounts for producer heterogeneity with respect to their costs 
of producing the GM, the GURT, the conventional and the alternative crops and, thus, 
with respect to the net returns producers receive from the production of the four crops. 
Producer heterogeneity in terms of production costs depends on factors like their 
dependency on saving seeds, location, agricultural conditions, skills and experience, size 
and education and is important in explaining the production of different crops.  
The use of genetically modified seed is assumed to generate production cost 
savings for producers while having no effect on product characteristics that are 
observable by consumers. Thus, the GM product considered is a producer-oriented, 1
st 
generation GMP rather than a consumer-oriented, 2
nd generation GMP (e.g., vitamin A 
enriched rice, high oleic acid soybean oil). However, there is no consensus in the 
s U  
Figure 2. Consumption decisions after the introduction of GURTs. 
G
nl U  
0 1
) ( αλ θµ +




nl p U −  
G
nl c ˆ  
Differentiating consumer attribute, c  
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literature as to the potential benefits of GURTs (i.e., on productivity of GURT seeds vs. 
GM seeds) for producers and how these benefits compare to benefits received from the 
use of 1
st generation GM seed.
8 Thus, different scenarios will be examined where farmers 
have some agronomic benefits from using GURTs versus GM seed and where such 
benefits do not exist.  
What is known is that producers cannot save and re-use seed the following year 
and have to return to the market every year if they use the GURTs seed. In this context, 
for producers to find it optimal to adopt GURTs, the expected benefits associated with the 
added attribute of the GURTs seed (e.g., increased productivity or drought resistance) 
should be greater than the expected costs (costs of returning to the market every year). In 
addition, under current law farmers can save non-GM seed (Ozertan et al. 2002). In the 
case of GM seed, however, there are Technology Use Agreements which prohibit re-use 
or sale of GM seed (Ozertan et al. 2002). Thus, producers who decide to use GM seed 
need to decide whether they will cheat on their licensing agreement or not. 
To capture these elements, producers are assumed to be uniformly distributed in 
the interval [] 1 , 0  and to differ with respect to an attribute  A, where [] 1 , 0 ∈ A . The 
parameter  A captures differences in the producers’ ability to save seed and other 
characteristics that affect their production costs (e.g., skills, experience, quality of land 
etc.). For simplicity it is assumed that every producer produces one unit of output. So the 
producer with an attribute  A, who produces one unit of the product, has the net 
                                                           
8For instance, Budd (2004) argues that even though GURTs might succeed in countries like Australia only 
if they offer large agronomic advantages to growers, he does not discuss what the agronomic benefits of 
GURTs might be. Pendleton (2004, p. 20) states that “even assuming that TT-protected seed has a higher 
cost than normal GM seed because … it must be purchased every year, the increased cost could be 
outweighed by the gains produced by the value-added traits, such as improved yield, improved chemical 
content, reduced need for chemical inputs…”. Shinivasan and Thirtle (2000; 2002; 2003) state that unlike 
GM varieties that offer agronomic benefits to farmers, TT offers only economic benefits to seed companies.   
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return/profit given by equation (12) before GURTs are introduced and by equation (13) 
after GURTs are introduced:  
 
f
cn lc p wA A β Π= − −                  if a unit of conventional product is  
 produced 
NC f
gm nl gm p wA δ Π= − −            if a unit of GM product is produced and  
(12)                          producers never cheat (no cheating) 




gm ) , ( ε ρ δ − − − = Π   if a unit of GM product is produced and      
              producers cheat (cheating), and 
0 = Π a                                         if a unit of an alternative product is  
  produced 
 
 




c β − − = Π                  if a unit of conventional product is  







gm δ − − = Π       if a unit of GM product is produced and  
(13)                  producers never cheat (no cheating) 






gm ) , ( ε ρ δ − − − = Π  if a unit of GM product is produced and  
  producers cheat (cheating) 
A w p gurt
G f
nl gurt γ − − = Π          if a unit of GURT product is produced, and 
0 = Π a                                     if a unit of an alternative product is  
  produced  
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In equations (12) and (13), 
f
nl p  and 
G f
nl p  denote the farm prices of the conventional, the 
GM, and the GURTs products, before and after the introduction of GURTs, respectively. 
Note that these products are marketed together as a non-labeled product both before and 
after the introduction of GURTs. The farm price includes all production costs except the 
cost of seed. The parameters  c w  and  gm w  denote the seed prices of the conventional and 
the GM product, respectively, before the introduction of GURTs, while 
G
gm w  and  gurt w  
denote the seed prices of the GM and the GURTs products, respectively, when GURTs are 
introduced. For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the 
conventional seed supply sector is perfectly competitive so that under the constant returns 
to scale technology the introduction of GURTs seed does not affect the price of the 
conventional seed,  c w . In this model, however, the price of GM seed is determined by the 
monopolist who introduces GURTs seed into the market so the price of GM seed after the 
introduction of GURTs, 
G
gm w , may be different from the price of GM seed under the status 
quo,  gm w . The parameters β , δ  and γ  are non-negative cost-enhancement factors and 
are constant across producers. It is assumed that  β δ < < 0 , which means that the GM 
crop is more cost effective than the conventional crop. It is also assumed that  δ γ ≤ , 
which means that the GURTs crop is at least as cost effective as the GM crop. Thus, if 
δ γ <  the GURT crop producers have some agronomic benefits over the GM crop 
producers, while if  δ γ =  there are no additional agronomic benefits from using GURTs 
seed over GM seed. The parameter ρ  is the probability of being caught saving GM seed, 
which, as discussed previously, is illegal, and h is the penalty the producer has to pay in  
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the case he is caught cheating.  
Given the specification of the profit functions in equations (12) and (13), a 
producer with an  A value of zero realizes higher profits than a producer with an  A value 
of one. Note, for instance, that a producer who produces the conventional product and has 
an  0 = A  realizes profits 
f




c p = Π , while a producer with an  1 = A  that 
produces this product realizes profits 
f




c w p  before 
and after the introduction of GURTs, respectively. In addition, it is assumed that 
producers with a value of  0 = A  save 100% of the seeds they need (i.e., they are the most 
efficient in reproducing their own seed) while producers with a value of  1 = A  buy all 
their seeds from the market. Thus, the producers who are expected to be most affected 
from the introduction of GURTs are those with low  A values.   
In the net returns for the conventional product,  c Π  and 
G
c Π , those farmers who 
find it profitable to save seed from the previous harvest will do so and will incur only a 
fraction of the cost of seed  c wA  (which depends on each individual producers’ ability to 
save seed,  A). For simplicity it is assumed that the cost of saving and reusing seed is 
zero. Thus,  c wA  represents the effective price the producer pays for the conventional 
seed.  
Producers who decide to use GM seed need to decide whether they will cheat on 
their agreement or not. If GM producers do not cheat, their profits, before and after the 
introduction of GURTs, are given by the profit function 
NC
gm Π  and 
G NC
gm Π , respectively. In 
this case, producers are buying GM seed every year regardless of their ability to save 
seed. If GM producers cheat on their agreement, their profits before and after the  
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introduction of GURTs are given by 
C
gm Π  and 
G C
gm Π , respectively. In this case, producers 
cheat and save GM seed based on their ability to save seed,  A, and they pay a penalty 
when they are caught cheating. The term  h ρ  denotes the expected penalty paid when the 
producer cheats on the licensing agreement and it is a function of the producer’s ability to 
save seed; the higher is the value of  A, the lower is the producer’s ability to save seed, 
and the smaller is the expected penalty the producer faces when he cheats on the 
agreement. The expected penalty,  h ρ ,  is a function of the producer’s ability to save seed 
, A, either because the probability of getting caught cheating, ρ , or the penalty paid by 
farmers when caught cheating, h, or both, are a function of  A. For tractability (i.e., to 
avoid non-linearities) it is assumed that only the probability of getting caught cheating is 
a function of the producer’s ability to save seed,  A, while the penalty paid when caught 
cheating is independent of the value of  A. For simplicity, the penalty, h, is determined 
by a regulator and is assumed to be exogenous to the seed company
9. 
The probability of being caught cheating, ρ , is a function of the effort, ε , the 
seed company puts into detecting producers, where  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ ε , and the characteristics of 
the producers, i.e., their ability to save seed,  A. The probability  ρ  is given by 
) 1 ( A − = ε ρ  which implies that the more effort the company puts into detecting 
producers, the higher is the probability of detecting producers that cheat, everything else 
constant. Also, the lower is the value of  A (i.e., the greater is the amount of seed saved 
by the producer), the greater is the probability that the producer will be caught cheating, 
                                                           
9In reality, companies set their own penalties. For example, Monsanto imposes a penalty of 15$ per acre for 
every acre planted with Roundup Ready canola seed not covered by the technology use agreement and if 
the grower sells, gives or transfers any seed containing the Roundup Ready gene for each acre capable of 
being planted using that seed (Network of Concerned Farmers, Copy of Technology User Agreement, 2003, 
http://www.non-gm-farmers.com/news_details.asp?ID=310).  
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everything else constant. As an example, when  1 ε =  the company exerts the maximum 
possible effort in identifying cheaters so that for the producer that saves seed 100% 
( 0 = A ) the probability of being caught cheating is equal to one ( 1 ρ ε == ). Note that, 
when  1 = A  then  0 = ρ , which implies that since a producer with characteristic  1 = A  
cannot save seed she will never get caught cheating. Given the above, the profits 
associated with the production of the GM product with illegally used seed before and 




gm ) 1 ( − − − − = Π ε δ  and 






gm ) 1 ( − − − − = Π ε δ  in equations (12) and (13), respectively. 
In the profit function for the GURTs product,  gurt Π , the cost of buying the seed, 
gurt w , is not affected by the value of  A (the producer’s ability to save seed). The reason 
is that the seed of a GURTs plant is sterile and all producers have to buy their seeds in the 
market.  
For simplicity, the profits of producing the alternative crop are normalized to zero. 
This assumption allows us to concentrate on the profits of the conventional, the GM and 
the GURTs products.  
Status Quo 
Producers are making decisions as to which product to produce taking the market price as 
given, i.e., thus, the market for the farm product is assumed to be competitive. The 
decisions of producers are based on the profits they earn, which depends on the market 
price and the cost of producing each product type. 
Note that at  0 A=  the net returns realized when the conventional product is 
produced are greater than the net returns realized when the GM product is produced and  
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producers do not cheat,  (0 ) (0 )
NC
cg m AA Π= > Π =  and the slope of the profit curve  c Π  is 
greater in absolute terms than the slope of the profit curve 
NC
gm Π  (i.e.,  δ β > + c w  since 
0 δ β <<). The above imply that both the conventional product and the GM product that 
is produced by producers who do not cheat can coexist in the market. In addition, at 
0 A=  the profits realized when the conventional product is produced are greater than the 
profits realized when the GM product is produced and producers cheat, 
(0 ) (0 )
C
cg m AA Π= > Π =  as long as  0 h ε > . Thus, for both the conventional and the GM 
product that is produced by producers who cheat to coexist in the market, the slope of the 
profit curve of the conventional product,  c Π  must be steeper than the slope of the profit 
curve of the GM product under cheating, 
C
gm Π  (i.e.,  h w w gm c ε δ β − + > + ). At  1 = A , 
(1 ) (1 )
CN C f
gm gm nl gm AA p w δ Π= = Π = = − −  since producers with characteristic  1 = A  do not 








gm Π > Π  
for any  [0,1) A∈ ; 
CN C
gmg m Π= Π for  1 = A . This implies that, if the penalty or the effort 
exerted by the seed company in identifying cheaters or both are low enough, the profits 
realized by producers that produce the GM product and cheat are greater than the profits 
realized by producers who produce the GM product and do not cheat. On the other hand, 




gm Π > Π  at  0 = A , which, given that at  1 = A  
CN C
gmg m Π= Π, 
implies that all producers who find it profitable to produce the GM product will not cheat 
on their agreements.   
The analysis proceeds assuming that all producers who find it profitable to 
produce the GM product will cheat on their licensing agreements according to their  
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ability to save seed ( A); thus, it is assumed that  gm w h < ε . Note that the above does not 
imply that all producers who produce the GM product will cheat; producers with an  A 
value equal to one will not cheat on their agreements. The analysis focuses on the 
producers who produce the GM product and cheat to better capture what is observed in 
practice and allow for the study of the incentives of the seed provider to introduce the 
GURTs variety where, due to the nature of the technology embodied in the seed, 
producers are unable to cheat. Note that if all producers who produce the GM product did 
not cheat regardless of their ability to save seed, then the seed company would not have 
an incentive to introduce the new type of sterile seed. 
Figure 3 depicts the case where the conventional product and the GM product 
produced by producers who cheat coexist in the market. For illustrative purposes, the 
profit function 
NC
gm Π  is also depicted.   
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The producer who is indifferent between producing the conventional product and 
the GM product while cheating is denoted by  c A , where:  







gm c c ε δ β
ε
+ − + −
= ⇒ Π = Π : . 
When producers are uniformly distributed between [ ] 1 , 0 ,  c A  gives the supply of 











. Note that if cheating while 
producing the GM product is ‘costless’ to the producer,  0 = h ε  (either because the effort 
exerted by the seed provider in identifying cheating or the penalty paid when caught 
cheating, or both, are zero), then  0 = c x ; that is, all producers would produce the GM 
) ( h wgm ε δ− +
f
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Figure 3. Production decisions before the introduction of GURTs. 
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product and the conventional product would not be produced. 
The producer who is indifferent between producing the GM product and the 
alternative product is denoted by  T A , where:  













= ⇒ Π = Π : . 
The supply of the GM crop produced by producers who cheat depending on their 
ability to save seed is given by:  
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gm ε δ β ε δ
β ε ε δ β
+ − − + − +
+ − + − − +
= ⇒  
and the supply of the alternative crop is given by:  





















− = ⇒ − = 1 1.  
Thus, producers with  [ ) c A A , 0 ∈  find it more profitable to produce the 
conventional product, producers with  ( ) T c A A A , ∈  produce the GM product and cheat, 
and producers with  ( ] 1 , T A A∈  produce the alternative product. Hence, producers at 
0 = A  who save 100% of their seed produce the conventional crop, while producers at 
1 = A  who buy all the seed they need in the market produce the alternative crop. 
After the introduction of GURT 
After the introduction of GURTs, producers need to decide whether to produce the 
GURTs product or not. This decision depends on the net returns they earn, which depend 
on a number of factors such as the relative seed and product prices before and after the  
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introduction of GURTs, the agronomic benefits of GURTs relative to the agronomic 
benefits of GMPs, the probability of being caught cheating and the penalty paid when 
caught cheating.  
As previously discussed, there are either no additional agronomic benefits from 
using the GURTs seed over the GM seed (i.e.,  δ γ = ), or the use of GURTs seed has 
some agronomic benefits over the GM seed (i.e.,  δ γ < ). Given that γ δ ≤  and 0 δ β < <  
the slopes of the profit curves 
G C
gm Π  and 
G
c Π  are greater in absolute terms than the slope 
of the profit curve  gurt Π  (i.e.,  γ ε δ > − + h w
G
gm  and  γ β > + c w , respectively). At  0 = A ,  
gurt
G
c Π > Π  and  gurt
G C
gm Π > Π  when  gurt w h < ε . This outcome is depicted in Figure 4, 
panel (i); the conventional, the GM and the GURTs products coexist in the market where 
the alternative product is also supplied.  
On the other hand, when  gurt w h > ε  then  gurt
G C
gm Π < Π  at  0 = A . In this case, after 
the introduction of GURTs only the conventional, the GURTs and the alternative product 




When all products coexist in the market (Figure 4, panel (i)), the producer who is 
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Figure 4. Production decisions after the introduction of GURTs. 
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indifferent between producing the conventional product and the GM product is denoted 
by  c A ˆ , where:    










c c ε δ β
ε
+ − + −
= ⇒ Π = Π ˆ : ˆ .  
In equation (18)  c A ˆ  gives the supply of the conventional product when the GURTs 
product is in the market, 






c ε δ β
ε
− + − +
= .  
The producer who is indifferent between producing the GM product and the 
GURTs product is denoted by  gm A ˆ , where:  












= ⇒ Π = Π ˆ : ˆ  
implying that when  h wgurt ε =  the GM  product will not be supplied. 
The supply of the GM product is given by:  
 (20)     
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c gm c gurt G C
gm ε δ β ε γ δ
γ β ε ε δ β
− + − + − − +
− + − + − − +
= ⇒ .  
The producer who is indifferent between producing the GURTs product and the 
alternative product is denoted by  T A ˆ , where: 









= ⇒ Π = Π ˆ : ˆ .      
The supply of the GURTs crop is given by:   
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(22)     
h w
h w w p





gurt gm T gurt ε γ δ
ε




= ⇒ − = ˆ ˆ  
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gurt ε γ δ γ
γε ε δ ε γ δ
− − +
− − + − − − +
= ⇒ . 
  The supply of the alternative crop is given by: 















− = ⇒ − = 1 ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ . 
Thus, producers with  [ ) c A A ˆ , 0 ∈  find it more profitable to produce the 
conventional product, producers with  ( ) gm c A A A ˆ , ˆ ∈  produce the GM product, producers 
with  ( ] T gm A A A ˆ , ˆ ∈  produce the GURTs product, and producers with  ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A A∈  produce 
the alternative product. Hence, producers at  0 = A  who save 100% of their seed produce 
the conventional crop, while producers at  1 = A  who buy 100% of their seed produce the 
alternative crop.  Those producers who are located closer to  1 = A , however, switch to the 
production of the GURTs crop. 
When only the conventional and the GURTs products are in the market along with 
the alternative product (Figure 4, panel (ii)), the producer who is indifferent between 
producing the conventional product and the GURTs product is denoted by  c A , where: 
(24)      
γ β − +
= ⇒ Π = Π
c
gurt
c gurt c c w
w
A A :.   
In equation (24)  c A  gives the supply of the conventional product when the GURTs 
product is in the market and the GM product is not produced, 







The producer who is indifferent between producing the GURTs product and the  
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alternative product is denoted by  T A  and is given by: 









= ⇒ Π = Π : . 
The supply of the GURTs product is given by:  
(26)      
γ β γ − +
−
−





gurt c T gurt w
w w p
x A A x  ⇒ 
() ( )
() γ β γ
β γ β
− +







w w w p
x . 
The supply of the alternative product is given by: 
(27)      11
fG fG







=− ⇒ =− =  and  a a x x = ˆ .  
Equations (23) and (27) show that the supply of the alternative product is the same 
regardless of whether the GM product is in or out of the market, this is because the 
analysis focuses on what is happening among the other products, i.e., GURTs, GM and 
alternative. When the GM product is out of the market that shows that GURTs capture the 
whole share of the GM production and/or some share of the alternative products. 
Thus, producers at [ ) c A , 0  find it more profitable to produce the conventional 
product, producers at ( ) T c A A ,  produce the GURTs product and producers at ( ] 1 , T A  
produce the alternative product. Similar to the previous analysis, producers at  0 = A  who 
save all their seed, produce the conventional crop, while producers at  1 = A  who buy all 
their seed, produce the alternative crop. Those located closer to  1 = A , however, switch to 
the production of the GURTs crop. 
2.3   Market Outcome  
The market outcome is found by simultaneously solving the demand and supply  
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equations. To enable the analysis of the monopolist’s pricing decision an additional 
variable and equation are introduced in the demand and supply systems as in Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004). Let  gm y  and 
G
gm y  be the GM seed sales of the monopolist before and 




gm x  and 
CG
gm x  is the total quantity supplied of the GM product before 
and after the introduction of GURTs, respectively, and  gurt x  is the total quantity supplied 
of the GURTs product. Unlike the GM quantity that is produced by both saved and 
bought seed, the GURTs quantity is produced only by purchased seed since GURTs seed 
cannot be saved and reused by producers. In addition, assuming fixed proportions 
between farm and seed levels,  gurt gurt x y = . The quantity of the GM seed produced, 
however, is a function of the producer’s ability to save seed,  A. The monopolist sells 
gm y  amount of GM seed before the introduction of GURTs and 
G
gm y  amount of GM seed 
after the introduction of GURTs and these quantities are a function of 
C
gm x  and 
CG
gm x , 
respectively, i.e.,  ) (
C
gm gm x f y =  and  ()
GC G
gm gm yf x = . Thus, the sales of the monopolist are 
a function of the producers’ ability to save seed; the greater is the value of  A, the smaller 
is the producers’ ability to save seed, and the greater is the quantity of seed sold by the 
monopolist. If all producers had an  A value of zero ( 0 = A ), they would save 100% of 
their seed and would not demand seed from the monopolist; in this case, the monopolist 
seed sales before and after the introduction of GURTs would be given by  0 = gm y  and 
0
G
gm y = , respectively. Therefore, when  0 = A  for all producers, 
C
gm x  is produced only by  
  33
saved seed. If all producers had an  A value of one ( 1 = A ), they would buy 100% of their 
seed from the monopolist. In this case, given our assumption of fixed proportions 
between the farm level and the monopoly level, the monopolist’s seed sales before and 
after the introduction of GURTs would be given by 
C
gm gm x y =  and 
GC G
gmg m yx = , 
respectively. Therefore, when  1 = A  for all producers, 
C
gm x  and 
CG
gm x  are produced only 
by purchased seed.  
Given the above and our assumption that producers are uniformly distributed 
along the interval [] 1 , 0  and each producer produces one unit of the product, the total 
quantity of GM product produced with purchased seed before the introduction of GURTs 
is given by aggregating among all producers who produce the GM product, that is, 












== ∫  
is the quantity of GM seed sold by the monopolist when GURTs are not introduced into 
the market. Substituting the expressions from equations (15) and (14) into the above 
expression gives the quantity of GM seed sold by the monopolist before GURTs are 
introduced as: 























 To get the total quantity of GM product produced with bought seed when GURTs 
enter the market, we aggregate among all producers located at ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  (see Figure 4, 














== ∫  is the quantity of GM seed sold by the 
monopolist after the introduction of GURTs. Substituting the expressions from equations  
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(19) and (18) the quantity of GM seed sold by the monopolist after GURTs are introduced 
is given by: 

























Given the assumption of fixed proportions and taking into account a constant marketing 
margin, mm, between the farm and the consumer prices, we have 
f
nl nl p pm m =+. The 
marketing margin mm is assumed to be the same under the status quo and when GURTs 
are introduced since the product remains non-labeled (there are no identity preservation 
costs) and for simplicity it is assumed to equal zero, thus 
f
nl nl p p = . The non-labeled 
product retail price under the status quo is obtained by equating the demand and supply 
equations,  nl nl sx = . The demand is given by equation (3), while the supply of the non-
labeled product, denoted by  nl x , is derived through the summation of the quantities 
supplied by the producers of the conventional,  c x , and the GM products, 
C
gm x , which are 
given by equations (14) and (16), respectively. Thus, the supply curve for the non-labeled 
product is a kinked curve since it contains two different products with different 
production costs, i.e., two different supply curves with different slopes. The supply curve 
for the non-labeled product under the status quo is depicted in Figure 5. The total quantity 
of the non-labeled product supplied is given by: 
(30)    
h w
h p










= ⇒ + = . 
Note that equation (30) gives the supply of the non-labeled product when only the GM  
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= ⇒ Π = Π :  ). Similarly, if only 
the conventional product was produced then the supply of the non-labeled product would 
















c a c c w
p
A A : ). Figure (5) below 
depicts the market equilibrium under the status quo.  
 
 
Thus, the retail price of the non-labeled product and the price of the GM seed are 
found by simultaneously solving  nl nl x s = ,  
f
nl nl p p =  and the equality in equation (28). 
Given the complexity of the above equations, we can not get an analytical solution of the 
equilibrium retail and GM seed prices. However, these prices will be a function of known 
parameters as expressed in equations (31) and (32) below.   
(31)          ( , , , , , , , , ) nl s c gm p fh p w y ε ψβδλ =   
Figure 5. Market equilibrium under the status quo.  
s p  
p  
x 0  *
nl x
* f
nl p  
ψλ  
h ε  
nl x
nl s ) ( β + c w
) ( h wgm ε δ − +   
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(32)          ( , , , , , , , , ) gms c g m wf h p w y ε ψβδλ =  
After the Introduction of GURTs 
The demand for the non-labeled product after the introduction of GURTs is given by 
equation (8), while the supply of the non-labeled product, denoted by 
G
nl x , is derived 
through the summation of the quantities supplied by the producers of the conventional, 
G
c x ,  the GM, 
G C
gm x , and the GURTs products,  gurt x , which are given by equations (18), 
(20), and (22), respectively. Thus, the supply curve for the non-labeled product is a 
kinked curve since it contains three different products with different production costs (see 
Figure 6 below). The total quantity of the non-labeled product supplied is given by: 













x x x x x
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= ⇒ + + = . 
Note that equation (33) gives the supply of the non-labeled product when only the 









= ⇒ Π = Π :  ).  Similarly, 
if only the conventional product was produced, then the supply of the non-labeled 








x  (since 
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A A : ), while, 
if only the GM product was produced, then the supply of the non-labeled product would 




























= ⇒ Π = Π : ).  
The retail price of the non-labeled product and the price of the GM and the 








nl p p = ,  gurt gurt x y =  and 
the equality in equation (29). Given the complexity of the above equations we can not get  
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an analytical solution of the equilibrium retail and GURTs seed prices. However, these 
prices will be a function of known parameters as expressed in equations (34), (35) and 
(36) below.   




nl y y w p h f p µ γ λ δ β α θ ψ ε =  




gm y y w p h f w µ γ λ δ β α θ ψ ε =    
(36)        ) , , , , , , , , , , , , , ( gurt
G
gm c s gurt y y w p h f w µ γ λ δ β α θ ψ ε =      
To determine the market equilibrium after the introduction of GURTs we need to 
determine how the introduction of GURTs will affect the supply of and the demand for 
the non-labeled product. The possible changes in the supply of the non-labeled product 
due to the introduction of GURTs are examined first, followed by the analysis of the 
possible changes in the demand for the non-labeled product.   
Figure 6 below depicts the possible changes in the supply of the non-labeled 
product after the introduction of GURTs, with the dashed and solid lines indicating the 
supply curve of the non-labeled product before and after the introduction of GURTs, 
respectively. The inverse supply of the non-labeled product before the introduction of 
GURTs consists of two segments: the inverse supply of the conventional product given 
by  nl c
f
nl x w p ) ( β + =  (segment before the kink) and the inverse supply of the GM product 
given by  nl gm
f
nl x h w h p ) ( ε δ ε − + + =  (segment after the kink). The inverse supply of the 
non-labeled product after the introduction of GURTs consists of three segments: the 




nl x w p ) ( β + =  







nl x h w h p ) ( ε δ ε − + + =  (segment after the first kink) and the inverse supply of  
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nl x w p γ + =  (segment after the second kink).  
In Figure 6 panel (i) depicts the supply curve of the non-labeled product before 
and after the introduction of GURTs when there is no change in the price of the GM seed 
after GURTs enter the market, thus, leaving the slope of the segment of the supply of the 
non-labeled product that refers to the GM product unchanged, i.e., 
h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + = − + . Panel (ii) depicts the change in the supply curve of the non-
labeled product when the price of the GM seed increases after the introduction of GURTs, 
causing the slope of the segment of the supply curve of the non-labeled product that 
corresponds to the production of the GM product to become steeper, i.e., 
h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + > − + . Note, that the intercept  h ε  remains unchanged. Panel (iii) 
depicts the change in the supply curve of the non-labeled product when the price of the 
GM seed drops after the introduction of GURTs, causing the slope of the segment of the 
supply curve of the non-labeled product that corresponds to the production of the GM 
product to become flatter, i.e.,  h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + < − + .                    
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Having determined the possible changes in the supply of the non-labeled product 
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Figure 6. Possible changes in the supply of the non-labeled product due 
to the introduction of GURTs. 
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for the non-labeled product caused by the introduction of GURTs. The inverse demand 
for the non-labeled product before and after the introduction of GURTs is given by 






nl s p p ) ( αλ θµ + − = , respectively. The intercept,  s p , is 
the price of the substitute product and it is assumed to be the same in both demand 
curves. It is thus assumed that the substitute product sector is perfectly competitive so the 
price of the substitute product does not change (i.e., the supply curve of the substitute 
product is perfectly elastic). Thus, the relationship between the slopes of the demand 
curves  nl s  and 
G
nl s  determines how the demand for the non-labeled product is affected 
after the introduction of GURTs. All possible relationships between the slopes of the 
demand curves are captured in the following cases that describe different scenarios 
regarding changes in the demand due to the introduction of GURTs.  
Case I: The demand curve for the non-labeled product does not change after the 
introduction of GURTs, i.e., the slopes of the demand curves,  nl s  and 
G
nl s , are equal, 
ψλ αλ θµ = + . 
For case I to emerge two conditions must be met, namely, the production shares of 
the GURTs and the GM products in the non-labeled product after the introduction of 
GURTs should equal to the production share of the GM product in the non-labeled 









+=⇒ = , and consumer aversion 
toward the GURTs product should equal to consumer aversion towards GMPs,  λ µ = .  
The above conditions that need to be satisfied for case I to emerge are satisfied only when 
the price of the GM seed after the introduction of GURTs is greater than the GM seed 
price before the introduction of GURTs,  gm
G
gm w w > , and when the total production of the  
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non-labeled product is greater after the introduction of GURTs than before GURTs are 
introduced,  nl
G
nl x x > . To see why this is the case, note that when  gm
G
gm w w >  the total 
quantity of the conventional product produced is greater after GURTs than before GURTs 
are introduced, i.e., 
G
cc x x > . This can be easily seen in Figure 3 where an increase in  gm w  
causes the GM profit curve, 
C
gm Π , to rotate inwards while leaving the conventional 
product profit curve,  c Π , unaffected (see also Figure 7 below). Since for the demand to 

















cc x x >  implies that  nl
G
nl x x >  must hold true. This case is feasible and is 
depicted in Figure 7. Thus, under case I, the price of the non-labeled product is lower 
after the introduction of GURTs.  
   
Note that,  gm
G
gm w w =  is not feasible under case I since if this condition was 
G
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Figure 7. Case I is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x > . 
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satisfied it would imply that  c
G
c x x =  as explained above and given that for case I to 
emerge the production shares must remain unchanged  c
G
c x x =  in turn implies that 
nl
G
nl x x = . It can be easily shown that when  gm
G
gm w w =   nl
G
nl x x >  as the GURTs supply 
curve is flatter than the GM supply curve and, thus, it intersects the demand curve below 
the point that the GM supply curve intersects it, leading to a greater quantity of the non-
labeled product being produced.  
Also note that,  gm
G
gm w w <  is not feasible under case I since if this condition was 
satisfied it would imply that  c
G
c x x <  which would in turn imply that  nl
G
nl x x < . However,  
since the slope of the GURTs segment of the supply curve is always flatter than the slope 
of the GM segment of the supply curve, it never intersects the demand curve at the higher 
point than the GM segment intersects and the total quantity of the non-labeled product 
supplied in the market increases, which, contradicts the requirement that  nl
G
nl x x < .  
The above analysis shows that under case I, the price of the non-labeled product is 
always greater before than after GURTs are introduced in the market, i.e., 
** f fG
nl nl p p > . 
Case II: The demand curve for the non-labeled product rotates to the left after the 
introduction of GURTs, i.e., the slopes of the new demand curve, 
G
nl s , is greater than the 
slope of the old demand curve,  nl s ,  ψλ αλ θµ > + . 
For case II to emerge, either the production shares of the GURTs and the GM 
products after the introduction of GURTs should be greater than the production share of 













⇒ > + ψ α θ , or consumer 
aversion toward the GURTs product should be greater than consumer aversion towards  
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GMPs,  λ µ > , or both.  
Case IIA. Consider first the case where the production shares of the GURTs and GM 
products in the non-labeled product after the introduction of GURTs are equal to the 









+=⇒ = , and  λ µ > .  Note that, in this case, even though the shares 
are the same the demand rotates inward after the GURTs enter the market. This case is 
very similar to the Case I. The only difference is that under this case 
G
gmg m ww ≥ <
 are all 
feasible (see Figure 8 panel (i), (ii) and (iii) for  gm
G
gm w w > ,  gm
G
gm w w =  and  gm
G
gm w w < , 
respectively) while under Case I only the case where  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x >  is feasible.  
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Figure 8. Conditions under which case IIA is feasible. 
c
G
c x x =
G










The above analysis shows that under case IIA, the price of the non-labeled product 
is always greater before than after GURTs are introduced in the market, i.e., 
** f fG
nl nl p p > . 
Case IIB. We now consider the case where the production shares of the GURTs and GM 
products after the introduction of GURTs are greater than the production share of the GM 













⇒ > + ψ α θ  and µ λ ≥ . Case IIB may 
emerge when the price of the GM seed after the introduction of GURTs is lower than the 
GM seed price before the introduction of GURTs,  gm
G
gm w w < , in which case the total 
production of the non-labeled product after the introduction of GURTs, is greater, lower 
than or equal to the production share of the non-labeled product under the status quo, 
G
nl nl x x ≥ < . To see why this is the case, note that when  gm
G
gm w w <  the total quantity of the 
conventional product produced is lower after GURTs than before GURTs are introduced, 
i.e.,  c
G
c x x < . This can be easily seen in Figure 3 where a decrease in  gm w  causes the GM 
profit curve, 
C
gm Π , to rotate outwards while leaving the conventional product profit curve, 
c Π , unaffected (see also Figure 9 below). Since for the demand to rotate inwards the 
production shares of the GURTs and GM products after the introduction of GURTs 
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Case IIB may also emerge when the price of the GM seed after the introduction of 
GURTs is greater than the GM seed price before the introduction of GURTs,  gm
G
gm w w > , 
in which case the total production of the non-labeled product is greater after the 
introduction of GURTs than before GURTs are introduced,  nl
G
nl x x > . To see why this is 
the case, note that when  gm
G
gm w w >  the total quantity of the conventional product 
produced is greater after than before GURTs are introduced, i.e.,  c
G
c x x > . This can be 
easily seen in Figure 3 where an increase in  gm w  causes the GM profit curve, 
C
gm Π , to 
rotate inwards while leaving the conventional product profit curve,  c Π , unaffected (see 
also Figure 10 below). Since for the demand to rotate inwards the production shares of 
the GURTs and GM products after the introduction of GURTs should be greater than the 
p  
x 0 
) ( β + c w
) ( h w
G
gm ε δ − +
ψλ
Panel (iii). Case IIB is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w <  and  
G
nl nl x x = . 
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Figure 9. Case IIB is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w < .   
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< . Since  gm
G
gm w w >  implies that 
G
cc x x >  then  nl
G
nl x x >  must hold 
true. This case is feasible and is depicted in Figure 10.  
 
 
Case IIB also emerge when the price of the GM seed after the introduction of 
GURTs stays unchanged,  gm
G
gm w w = , in which case the total production of the non-
labeled product is greater after the introduction of GURTs than before GURTs are 
introduced.  nl
G
nl x x > . To see why this is the case, note that  gm
G
gm w w = , the total quantity 
of the conventional product produced is the same after the introduction of GURTs, i.e., 
c
G
c x x = .  This can be easily seen in Figure 3 where an increase in  gm w  causes the GM 
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Figure 10. Case IIB is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w >  and   nl
G
nl x x > . 
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gm Π , to rotate inwards while leaving the conventional product profit curve, 
c Π , unaffected (see also Figure 11 below). Since for the demand to rotate inwards the 
production shares of the GURTs and GM products after the introduction of GURTs 




















< . Since  gm
G
gm w w =  implies that  c
G
c x x =  
then  nl
G
nl x x >  must hold true. This case is feasible and is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
The above analysis shows that under case IIB, the price of the non-labeled product 
is always greater before than after GURTs are introduced in the market, i.e., 
** f fG
nl nl p p > . 
Case III: The demand curve for the non-labeled product rotates to the right after the 
introduction of GURTs, i.e., the slope of the new demand curve, 
G
nl s , is smaller than the 
p  
x  
) ( β + c w h ε  
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nl x
Figure 11. Case IIB is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w =  and  nl
G
nl x x > . 
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slope of the old demand curve,  nl s , θµα λψ λ + < .  
For case III to emerge the production shares of the GURTs and the GM products after the 
introduction of GURTs should be lower than the production share of the GM product 









+<⇒ < . The above conditions that need to be 
satisfied for case III to emerge are satisfied when the price of the GM seed after the 
introduction of GURTs is greater than the GM seed price before the introduction of 
GURTs,  gm
G
gm w w > , and when the total production of the non-labeled product either 
remains the same or is greater after the introduction of GURTs than before GURTs are 
introduced, 
G
nl nl x x ≥ . To see why this is the case, note that when  gm
G
gm w w >  the total 
quantity of the conventional product produced is greater after GURTs than before GURTs 
are introduced, i.e., 
G
cc x x > . This can be easily seen in Figure 3 where an increase in  gm w  
causes the GM profit curve, 
C
gm Π , to rotate inwards while leaving the conventional 














implies that the production share of the conventional product is greater after GURTs than 
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Thus, since  gm
G
gm w w >  implies that 
G
cc x x > , then 
G
nl nl x x ≥  must hold true. These cases 
are feasible and are depicted in Figure 12 panels (i) and (ii).  
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Also note that,  gm
G
gm w w =  and  gm
G
gm w w <  are not feasible under case III since 
they would imply that  c
G
c x x =  and  c
G
c x x < , respectively, which would in turn imply that 
()
G
gm wh δ ε +−
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Panel (i): Case III is feasible when  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x = . 
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Figure 12. Conditions under which case III is feasible. 











nl x x < . However, when either  gm
G
gm w w =  or  gm
G
gm w w < ,  nl
G
nl x x > , which, contradicts 
the requirement that  nl
G
nl x x < .  
The above analysis shows that unlike cases I, IIA and IIB, were the introduction of 
GURTs leads to a reduction in the price of the non-labeled product, under case III, the 
price of the non-labeled product is always greater after than before GURTs are introduced 
in the market, i.e., 
** f Gf
nl nl p p > . 
2.4. Innovating  firm   
To determine the final equilibrium prices we need to examine the profit maximizing 
decisions of the firm supplying the GM and GURTs seed. The model assumes that the 
innovating firm is a monopoly who is supplying GM seed in the market before GURTs 
are introduced and once it develops the V-GURTs variety it supplies both GM and 
GURTs seed.
10 The firm decides on how to price its product or equivalently how much 
seed to supply which depends on its cost structure and on the demand it faces from 
farmers buying GM and GURTs seed and on how competing varieties are priced in the 
market. 
Status Quo 
The monopolist decides how to price the GM seed or, equivalently, how much to supply 
to the market, based on demand it faces from producers buying GM seed. The 
monopolist’s profit function is given by: 




) ( max − = π  
In equation (37)  gm w  is the inverse derived demand faced by the monopolist given in 
                                                           
10 This is equivalent to assuming that the firm has patent protection for both the GM and the GURTs variety 
that it develops.   
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implicit form in equation (3.32),  gm m  is the constant marginal cost of producing the GM 
seed and  gm y  is the amount of GM seed the monopoly sells before the introduction of 
GURTs. Since we were not able to get an analytical solution for the equilibrium retail and 
GM seed prices we can only get a numerical solution to the monopolist optimization 
problem through a calibration of the model.  
After the Introduction of GURTs 
The monopolist now decides how to price the GM and the GURTs seed or equivalently 
how much of each to supply to the market depending on the demand it faces from 
producers buying GM and GURTs seed, its cost structure and the prices of competing 
varieties in the market. The monopolist’s profit function is given by: 










− − + − = ) ( ) ( max
,
π  
In equation (38) 
G
gm w  and  gurt w  are the inverse derived demands for the GM and 
GURTs seed that the monopolist faces, the implicit form of which is given by equations 
(35) and (36), respectively, 
G
gm m  and  gurt m  are the constant marginal costs of producing 
the GM seed and the GURT seed, respectively, 
G
gm y  and  gurt y  is the amount of GM and 
GURTs seed the monopoly sells after the introduction of GURTs, respectively, and FC  
are fixed costs of the company which includes the costs of developing the seed (i.e., R&D 
costs). Since we were not able to get an analytical solution for the equilibrium retail, GM 
and GURTs seed prices, we can only get a numerical solution to the monopolist 
optimization problem through a calibration of the model.   
3.  Welfare Effects of the Introduction of GURTs 
3.1   Consumer Welfare Effects   
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The consumer welfare effects of the introduction of GURTs depend on a number of 
factors such as the production share of GURTs in the total production, consumer aversion 
to GURTs relative to consumer aversion to GMPs and the relative input prices before and 
after the introduction of GURTs. The above factors determine the nature of the demand 
and supply functions for the non-labeled product after the introduction of GURTs which 
in turn determine the output and price levels of the non-labeled product after GURTs are 
introduced. The possible changes in the demand and supply of the non-labeled product 
and the consequent changes in its price caused by the introduction of GURTs were 
examined in section 2.3. Following is an analysis of how the changes in the price of the 
non-labeled product under the equilibrium outcomes examined previously (cases I, IIA, 
IIB, and III) affect the welfare of the consumers of the final product.  
Under Case I, where the slopes of the demand curves, 
G
nl s  and  nl s  are equal 
( ψλ αλ θµ = + ), and the equilibrium price of the non-labeled product decreases after 
GURTs are introduced ( nl
G
nl p p < ), the utility derived by consumers from the 
consumption of the non-labeled product is greater after the introduction of GURTs – 
G
nl U  
is above  nl U  – for all c values. Thus, under case I, there is an undisputed increase in 
consumer welfare under the introduction of GURTs. This outcome is depicted in Figure 
13, panel (i) as an upward parallel shift (since the demand slopes are equal and  nl
G
nl p p < ) 
of the utility of the non-labeled product. Note also that the consumers who are located at 
( )
G
nl nl c c ˆ , ˆ  switch from consuming the relatively less expensive substitute product to 
consuming the non-labeled product.  
Under Case II (both IIA and IIB), where the slope of the new demand curve, 
G
nl s , is  
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greater than the slope of the old demand curve,  nl s , ( ψλ αλ θµ > + ), and the equilibrium 
price of the non-labeled product decreases after GURTs are introduced ( nl
G
nl p p < ), 
different outcomes are possible, depending on the price difference of the non-labeled 
product before and after the introduction of GURTs. Thus, if the price difference is large 
enough, 
G
nl U  can be above  nl U  for all c values, resulting in a gain in consumer welfare 
due to the introduction of GURTs (as depicted in Figure 13, panel (ii)). Note also that, the 
consumers who are located at ( )
G
nl nl c c ˆ , ˆ  switch from consuming the substitute product to 
consuming the now relatively less expensive non-labeled product. If the price difference 
is not too large, 
G
nl U  can be above  nl U  for low c values and below  nl U  for high c values 
resulting in a gain in consumer welfare for consumers with low c values and a loss in 
consumer welfare for consumers with high c values due to the introduction of GURTs. 
Thus, for consumers with low aversion to interventions in the production process, the 
lower price of the non-labeled product more than compensates for the increase in 
disutility due to the introduction of GURTs (either because  ψ α θ > +  or  λ µ > ) and 
these consumers experience a welfare gain while for consumers with relatively high 
levels of aversion, the decrease in price cannot compensate for the increase in disutility 
due to the introduction of GURTs and these consumers experience a welfare loss. This 
outcome is depicted in Figure 13, panel (iii). Thus, the consumers who are located at 
[ )
* * , 0 nl c  receive higher utility from purchasing a unit of the non-labeled product, the 
consumers who are located at ( ) nl nl c c ˆ ,
* *  receive lower utility from purchasing a unit of the 
non-labeled product, while those located at 
* *
nl c  do not experience any change in their 




nl c c ˆ , ˆ  switch from consuming the non-labeled product to consuming the substitute 
product.  
Under Case III, where the slope of the new demand curve, 
G
nl s , is smaller than the 
slope of the old demand curve,  nl s , ( ψλ αλ θµ < + ), and the equilibrium price of the non-
labeled product increases after GURTs are introduced ( nl
G
nl p p > ), different outcomes are 
possible, depending on the price difference of the non-labeled product before and after 
the introduction of GURTs. Thus, if the price difference is large enough  nl U  can be above 
G
nl U  for all c values resulting in a loss of consumer welfare due to the introduction of 
GURTs (as depicted in Figure 13, panel (iv)). Note that, the consumers who are located at 
( ) nl
G
nl c c ˆ , ˆ  switch from consuming the now relatively more expensive non-labeled product 
to consuming the substitute product. If the price difference of the non-labeled product 
before and after GURTs are introduced is not too large, then  nl U  can be above 
G
nl U  for 
low c values and below 
G
nl U  for high c values resulting in a loss in consumer welfare for 
consumers with low c values and a gain in consumer welfare for consumers with high c 
values due to the introduction of GURTs. This occurs because, for consumers with low 
levels of aversion to interventions in the production process, the decrease in utility due to 
the higher product prices is lower than the increase in utility due to the reduction in the 
production shares of the GM and the GURTs products. On the other hand, for those 
consumers with relatively high levels of aversion to interventions in the production 
process, the utility increase due to the decrease in the probability of getting the GM and 
the GURTs products more than compensates for the utility decrease due to the higher 
product price. This outcome is depicted in Figure 13, panel (v). Thus, the consumers who  
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are located at [ )
* * , 0 nl c  receive lower utility from purchasing a unit of the non-labeled 
product, the consumers who are located at ( )
G
nl nl c c ˆ ,
* *  receive higher utility from 
purchasing a unit of the non-labeled product, while those located at 
* *
nl c  do not experience 
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Figure 13. Changes in consumer welfare due to the introduction of GURTs. 
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Given the above, the effect of the introduction of GURTs on consumer welfare 
depends on the price difference of the non-labeled product resulting from the introduction 
of GURTs and the magnitude of the price difference, consumer aversion to GURTs 
relative to their aversion to GMPs and the production shares of the GM, the GURTs and 
the conventional products.  
As was discussed in section 2, the analysis was conducted under the assumption 
that consumers are uniformly distributed between zero and one, i.e.,  [] 1 , 0 ∈ c .  If the 
distribution of consumers between the c values is skewed, the magnitude of the welfare 
effects depends on the skewness of the distribution. For instance, in the case depicted in 
Figure 13, panel (iii), if relatively more consumers have low aversion to interventions in 
the production process (are closer to zero) it is more likely that the introduction of 
GURTs will result in welfare gains rather than in welfare losses. 
3.2  Producer Welfare Effects 
The producer welfare effects of the introduction of GURTs depend on the relative product 
and seed prices before and after the introduction of GURTs, the agronomic benefits of the 
GURTs seed over the GM seed, producers’ ability to save seed and the expected penalty 
the producers pay when they cheat on the licensing agreements. 
Following is an analysis of how producer welfare is affected by the introduction 
of GURTs under the equilibrium outcomes examined previously, i.e., cases I, IIA, IIB, and 
III. The impact in producer welfare is examined by comparing the profits producers 
receive from the production of different crops before and after GURTs are introduced. 
Under case I, which emerges only when  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x > , there is a 




nl p p < . The above conditions are also observed under cases IIA, and IIB 
depicted in Figure 8, panel (i) and in Figure 10, in section 2. Figure 14, panel (i), depicts 








nl ε ε − < − , 
gm
G
gm w w >  and thus, the slopes of the profit curve of  the GM product are such that 
h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + > − + , and  nl
G
nl x x > , i.e.,  T T A A > ˆ . Note that, the solid and the 
dashed lines indicate the profit levels before and after the introduction of GURTs, 
respectively. From the graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers find it 
optimal to increase the production of the conventional product, reduce the production of 
the GM and the alternative products and start producing the GURTs product. The 
producers who are located at [ ) c A , 0,   ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  and ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  do not switch their production 
and keep producing the conventional, the GM and the alternative products, respectively. 
The producers who find it optimal to switch their production after the introduction of 
GURTs are the producers who are located at ( ) c c A A ˆ ,  who switch from producing the 
now relatively more expensive GM product to producing the relatively less expensive 
conventional product; the producers who are located at ( ) T gm A A , ˆ  who decide not to 
produce the relatively more expensive GM products and switch to the production of the 
GURTs products; and the producers who are located at ( ) T T A A ˆ ,  who produce the 
alternative products under the status quo but after the introduction of GURTs find it more 
profitable to produce the GURTs products. Recall that, for the GURTs product to be 
produced the following conditions need to hold; the price of the GURTs seed should be 
greater than the expected penalty producers face when they cheat on their GM licensing  
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agreement,  h wgurt ε > , and the slope of the GM profit curve should be greater than the 
slope of the GURTs profit curve (i.e., the production of the GURTs product is more cost 
efficient than the production of the GM product for producers with relatively low 
dependence on saving seed (high  A values),  γ ε δ > − + h w
G
gm ).  
When comparing the profit levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that after the introduction of GURTs some producers 
experience a decrease in their profits, others an increase in their profits and some are not 
affected. Specifically, the producers located at [ )
* * , 0 A , who are those producing the 
conventional and the GM products and those producing the GURTs product and have 
relatively low  A values (high dependency on saving seed), experience a decrease in their 
profits, while those located at  ) ˆ , (
* *
T A A  who are those producing the GURTs product and 
have relatively high  A values (low dependency on saving seed) experience an increase in 
their profits. Obviously, the producers located at ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  who produce the alternative 
product and at 
* * A  do not experience any changes in their profits due to the introduction 
of GURTs.  
The intuition behind this outcome is that those producers who save seed relatively 
more (i.e., those located closer to zero), loose after GURTs are introduced due to the 
lower price they receive for their product in the market (conventional, GM and lower  A 
value GURTs producers), the higher GM seed price (GM producers) and their inability to 
save seed (lower  A value GURTs producers). On the other hand, the producers who save 
seed relatively less (i.e., those located closer to one), gain after the introduction of 
GURTs since the reduction in their profits due to the lower price of the non-labeled  
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product is smaller than the increase in their profit due to the adoption of the relatively 
more cost efficient GURTs product. 
The producer welfare effects under case IIA when 
G
gm gm w w =  (thus, when the 
slope of the profit curve of the GM product remains the same, i.e., 
h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + = − + ) and 
G




nl p p <  are depicted in 
Figure 14, panel (ii). From the graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers 
find it optimal to keep the production of the conventional and the alternative products 
unchanged, reduce the production of the GM product and start producing the GURTs 
product. The producers who are located at [ ) c A ˆ , 0 , ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  and ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  do not switch 
their production and keep producing the conventional, the GM and the alternative 
products, respectively. The producers who find it optimal to switch their production after 
the introduction of GURTs are the producers who are located at ( ) T gm A A ˆ , ˆ  who switch 
from producing the GM product to producing the GURTs product after the introduction 
of GURTs. When comparing the profit levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that all producers who produce the non-labeled product 
(producers located at [ ) T A ˆ , 0 ) experience a decrease in their profits due to the introduction 
of GURTs. 
The intuition behind this outcome is that those producers who save seed relatively 
more (i.e., those located closer to zero), and even those who save seed relatively less (i.e., 
those located closer to one), loose after GURTs are introduced due to the lower price they 
receive for their product in the market (conventional, GM and GURTs producers) and 
their inability to save seed (lower  A value GURTs producers loose more than higher  A  
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value GURTs producers). For producers with high  A values, even though it is more 
profitable to produce the GURTs than keep producing the GM product, the lose in profits 
due to the lower price they receive for their product is greater than the gain they 
experience by adopting the GURTs product; either the GURTs seed price is not as low or 
the agronomic benefits of the GURTs seed are not as high or both as in the case depicted 
in Figure 14, panel (i).   
Under case IIA, when  gm
G
gm w w <  and  nl
G
nl x x < , there is a decrease in the 
equilibrium price of the non-labeled product due to the introduction of GURTs,  nl
G
nl p p < . 
The above conditions are also observed under case IIB depicted in Figure 9 panel (ii). 




nl p p <  




nl ε ε − < − ,  gm
G
gm w w <  and thus, the slopes of the profit curve of  the 
GM product  are such that  h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + < − + , and  nl
G
nl x x < , i.e.,  T T A A < ˆ . 
From the graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers find it optimal to 
reduce the production of the conventional, the GM and the alternative products and start 
producing the GURTs product. The producers who are located at [ ) c A ˆ , 0 , ( ) gm c A A ˆ ,  and 
( ] 1 , T A  do not switch their production and keep producing the conventional, the GM and 
the alternative products, respectively. The producers who find it optimal to switch their 
production after the introduction of GURTs are the producers who are located at ( ) c c A A , ˆ  
who switch from producing the relatively more expensive conventional product to 
producing the now relatively less expensive GM product; the producers who are located 
at ( ) T gm A A ˆ , ˆ  who decide not to produce the GM products and switch to the production of  
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the GURTs products; and the producers who are located at ( ) T T A A , ˆ  who produce the GM 
products under the status quo but after the introduction of GURTs find it more profitable 
to produce the alternative products.  
When comparing the profit levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that all producers who produce the non-labeled product 
(producers located at [ ) T A ˆ , 0 ) experience a decrease in their profits due to the introduction 
of GURTs. The intuition behind this outcome is similar to the outcome examined above 
and depicted in Figure 14, panel (ii), i.e., the lower product price results in losses that 
cannot be eliminated by gains due to the lower GM seed price and/or the adoption of the 
GURTs product.   
The producer welfare effects under case IIB when 
G
gm gm w w =  (thus, when the 
slope of the profit curve of the GM product remains the same, i.e., 
h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + = − + ) and  nl
G




nl p p <  are depicted in 
Figure 14, panel (vi). From the graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers 
find it optimal to keep the production of the conventional product unchanged, reduce the 
production of the GM and the alternative products and start producing the GURTs 
product. The producers who are located at [ ) c A ˆ , 0 , ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  and ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  do not switch 
their production and keep producing the conventional, the GM and the alternative 
products, respectively. The producers who find it optimal to switch their production after 
the introduction of GURTs are the producers who are located at ( ) T gm A A , ˆ  who decide not 
to produce the GM products and switch to the production of the GURTs products; and the 
producers who are located at ( ) T T A A ˆ ,  who produce the alternative products under the  
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status quo but after the introduction of GURTs find it more profitable to produce the 
GURTs products. 
When comparing the profit levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that after the introduction of GURTs some producers 
experience a decrease in their profits, others an increase in their profits and some are not 
affected. Specifically, the producers located at [ )
* * , 0 A , who are those producing the 
conventional and the GM products and those producing the GURTs product and have 
relatively low  A values (high dependency on saving seed), experience a decrease in their 
profits, while those located at  ) ˆ , (
* *
T A A  who are those producing the GURTs product and 
have relatively high  A values (low dependency on saving seed) experience an increase in 
their profits. Obviously, the producers located at ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  who produce the alternative 
product and at 
* * A  do not experience any changes in their profits due to the introduction 
of GURTs.  
The intuition behind this outcome is that those producers who save seed relatively 
more (i.e., those located closer to zero), loose after GURTs are introduced due to the 
lower price they receive for their product in the market (conventional, GM and lower  A 
value GURTs producers), the higher GM seed price (GM producers) and their inability to 
save seed (lower  A value GURTs producers). On the other hand, the producers who save 
seed relatively less (i.e., those located closer to one), gain after the introduction of 
GURTs since the reduction in their profits due to the lower price of the non-labeled 
product is smaller than the increase in their profit due to the adoption of the relatively 
more cost efficient GURTs product. 
In essence, what we observe is that when the equilibrium price of the non-labeled  
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product is lower after than before GURTs are introduced, profit gains can be realized only 
by those producers who find it optimal to adopt the GURTs product and have relatively 
low dependency on saving seed (high  A values). These profit gains are experienced only 
when the total quantity of the non-labeled product produced increases when GURTs are 
introduced,  nl
G
nl x x >  as depicted in Figure 14, panel (i). This outcome also emerges under 
case IIB, when  gm
G
gm w w < ,  nl
G
nl x x > , and  nl
G
nl p p < , depicted in Figure 14, panel (iv). On 
the other hand, as long as the total quantity of the non-labeled product produced 
decreases or remains unchanged when GURTs are introduced, 
G
nl nl x x ≤ , a reduction in the 
equilibrium price of the non-labeled product results in welfare losses for all producers as 
depicted in Figure 14, panels (ii) and (iii). This outcome also emerges under case IIB, 
when  gm
G
gm w w < ,  nl
G
nl x x =  and  nl
G
nl p p < , depicted in Figure 14, panel (v).   
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Under case III, when  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x = , there is an increase in the 
equilibrium price of the non-labeled product due to the introduction of GURTs,  nl
G
nl p p > . 




nl p p >  and 




nl ε ε − > − ,  gm
G
gm w w >  and thus, the slopes of the profit curve of  the GM 
product are such that  h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + > − + , and  nl
G
nl x x = , i.e.,  T T A A = ˆ .  From the 
graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers find it more optimal to increase 
the production of the conventional product, reduce the production of the GM product and 
start producing the GURTs product. The producers who are located at [ ) c A , 0,   ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  
and ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  do not switch their production and keep producing the conventional, the GM 
and the alternative products, respectively. The producers who find it optimal to switch 
their production after the introduction of GURTs are the producers who are located at 
( ) c c A A ˆ ,  who switch from producing the now relatively more expensive GM product to 
producing the relatively less expensive conventional product and the producers who are 
located at ( ) T gm A A , ˆ  who produce the GM products under the status quo but after the 
introduction of GURTs find it more profitable to produce the GURTs product.  
When comparing the profits levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that after the introduction of GURTs some producers 
experience an increase in their profits, others a decrease in their profits and some are not 
affected. Specifically, the producers located at [ ) c A ˆ , 0  who are those producing the 
conventional product experience an increase in their profits, while those located at 
) ˆ , ˆ ( T c A A who are those producing the GM and the GURTs products experience a decrease  
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in their profits. Obviously, the producers located at ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  who produce the alternative 
product do not experience any changes in their profits due to the introduction of GURTs. 
The intuition behind this outcome is that those producers who save seed relatively 
more (i.e., those located closer to zero), gain after GURTs are introduced due to the 
higher price they receive for their product in the market (conventional producers). Those 
producers who save seed relatively less (i.e., those located closer to one) loose after 
GURTs are introduced, even though they receive a higher price for their product, due to 
the higher GM seed price (GM producers) and their inability to save seed (GURTs 
producers). Note that, the lower  A value GURTs producers loose more than higher  A 
value GURTs producers. 
Under case III, when  gm
G
gm w w >  and  nl
G
nl x x > , there is an increase in the 
equilibrium price of the non-labeled product due to the introduction of GURTs,  nl
G
nl p p > . 




nl p p >  and 




nl ε ε − > − ,  gm
G
gm w w >  and thus, the slopes of the profit curve of the GM 
product are such that  h w h w gm
G
gm ε δ ε δ − + > − + , and  nl
G
nl x x > , i.e.,  T T A A > ˆ . From the 
graph we see that, under the above conditions, producers find it optimal to increase the 
production of the conventional product, reduce the production of the GM and the 
alternative products and start producing the GURTs product. The producers who are 
located at [ ) c A , 0,   ( ) gm c A A ˆ , ˆ  and ( ] 1 , ˆ
T A  do not switch their production and keep 
producing the conventional, the GM and the alternative products, respectively. The 
producers who find it optimal to switch their production after the introduction of GURTs 
are the producers who are located at ( ) c c A A ˆ ,  who switch from producing the now  
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relatively more expensive GM product to producing the relatively less expensive 
conventional product; the producers who are located at ( ) T gm A A , ˆ  who decide not to 
produce the now relatively more expensive GM products and switch to the production of 
the GURTs products; and the producers who are located at ( ) T gm A A , ˆ  who produce the 
alternative products under the status quo but after the introduction of GURTs find it more 
profitable to produce the GURTs.  
When comparing the profits levels the producers receive before and after the 
introduction of GURTs we notice that all producers who produce the non-labeled product 
(producers located at [ ) T A ˆ , 0 ) experience an increase in their profits due to the 
introduction of GURTs. The intuition behind this outcome is that losses in profits due to 
the increase in the prices of the GM seed (for producers who find it optimal to keep 
producing the GM product) or due to the inability to save and reuse seed (for producer 
who find it optimal to adopt GURTs) are lower than gains in profits due to the higher 
product price. The graph in Figure 15, panel (ii), depicts the case when all producers gain. 
By allowing the slope of the GM curve to be steeper one can get the outcome where some 
GM producers do not experience any change in their profits. 
As was mentioned before, the analysis is conducted under the assumption that 
producers are uniformly distributed between zero and one, i.e.,  [] 1 , 0 ∈ A . If the 
distribution of producers between  A values is skewed, the magnitude of the welfare 
effects depends on the skewness of the distribution. For instance, in Figure 15, panel (i), 
if relatively more producers save large percentage of their seed (are closer to zero) it is 
more likely that the introduction of GURTs will result in welfare gains rather than in 
welfare losses.  
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To summarize the main findings of this section, under Case I, all consumers who 
purchase the non-labeled product and some producers who produce the GURTs product 
and have relatively high  A values (i.e., low dependency on saving seed) experience an 
increase in their welfare due to the introduction of GURTs. However, the producers of the 
conventional and GM products and those who produce the GURTs product but have 
relatively lower  A values experience a decrease in their welfare due to the introduction 
of GURTs. 
 Under case II, with the large price decrease of the non-labeled product after 
GURTs are introduced all consumers who purchase the non-labeled product experience 
an increase in their welfare, while with the small price decrease only the consumers with 
only low c values (i.e., low levels of aversion to interventions in the production process) 
benefit from the introduction of GURTs. Under case II, the only producers who may 
benefit from the introduction of GURTs are those who find it optimal to produce the 
GURTs product and have relatively high  A values; the rest experience a decrease in their 
welfare due to the introduction of GURTs.  
Finally, under case III, when the increase in the equilibrium price of the non-
labeled product is large, all consumers experience a decrease in their welfare due to the 
introduction of GURTs, while when the increase is relatively small, the consumers with 
low c values loose and those with high c values benefit (i.e., with low and high levels of 
aversion to interventions in the production process, respectively) from the introduction of 
GURTs. Under case III, the producers producing the conventional product experience an 
increase in their welfare due to the introduction of GURTs. The producers producing the 
GM product benefit (loose) due to the introduction of GURTs, when the increase in the  
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product price is greater (lower) than the increase in the cost of producing the GM 
product. Finally, the producers of the GURTs product benefit (loose) due to the 
introduction of GURTs, when producing the GURTs product is relatively more (not much 
more) cost effective than producing the GM product.  
3.3  The Incentives of the Innovating Firm  
The market outcome analysis in section 2.3 and the subsequent welfare analysis in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2 has been conducted assuming different pricing strategies for the 
innovating firm. Different outcomes have been discussed based on how the monopolist 
prices her products, i.e., whether she increases, decreases, or keeps unchanged the price 
of GM seed after she introduces GURTs into the market, as well as the pricing and the 
agronomic characteristics of the GURTs product that she introduces. Knowing how 
consumers and producers react to these different strategies (under the different outcomes) 
the monopolist can decide on the optimal strategy. For instance, the monopolist knows 
that if consumer aversion to GURTs is relatively high (µ λ > ), if she increases the price 
of the GM seed after she introduces GURTs, she might loose market share for the GM 
and GURTs product (e.g., θ αψ +< - case III).  
The analysis shows that in most cases (see Figure 14 and Figure 15) the GURTs 
product captures market share from the GM product and in some cases from the 
alternative product. For example, in the case depicted in Figure 14, panel (iv), the 
monopolist knows that when she reduces the price of the GM seed after she introduces 
the GURTs seed, she can capture producers who, under the status quo, find it optimal to 
produce the conventional product. At the same time, if the monopolist introduces the 
GURTs seed at a relatively low price more producers will find it profitable to switch their  
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production from the GM and the alternative to the GURTs crops, even when their 
dependency on saving seed is relatively high. In addition, if the monopolist works on 
increasing the agronomic characteristics of GURTs,  δ γ < , which will provide the 
GURTs producers with higher benefits over the GM producers, then the slope of the 
GURTs product would become flatter, and as it can be seen from Figure 14, panel (iv), 
the GURTs product will attract more producers from the alternative product sector. As a 
result, more producers can experience an increase in their welfare due to the introduction 
of GURTs.  
As another example, see the case depicted in Figure 15, panel (ii), where the 
monopolist knows that when she increases the price of the GM seed after she introduces 
the GURTs seed, she can loose those producers who, under the status quo, find it optimal 
to produce the GM product and with the increase of the GM seed price will produce the 
conventional product instead. At the same time, if the monopolist introduces the GURTs 
seed at a relatively low price, more producers will find it profitable to switch their 
production from the GM and the alternative to the GURTs crop, even when their 
dependency on saving seed is relatively high. In addition, if the monopolist works on 
increasing the agronomic characteristics of GURTs,  then the slope of the GURTs product 
would become flatter, and as it can be seen from Figure 14, panel (iv), the GURTs 
product will attract more producers from the alternative product sector. As a result, more 
producers can experience an increase in their welfare due to the introduction of GURTs.  
Therefore, for the monopolist to be able to capture a greater share of the market 
after she introduces GURTs, she should price the GURTs seed at a relatively low price 
and/or the GURTs product she introduces should offer greater agronomic benefits than  
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the GM product. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper develops an analytical model of heterogeneous consumers and producers to 
examine the market and welfare effects of the introduction of V-GURTs in the US market. 
This study is the first to examine the potential impacts of GURTs for the innovator of the 
technology, the farmers, and the consumers of the final products.  
Specifically, the study examines how the agronomic characteristics of GURTs, 
consumer perceptions and preferences regarding interventions in the production process 
(i.e., genetic modification) and producer cost structures (e.g., dependence on saving seed) 
affect the adoption of the technology by producers, the market acceptance of GURTs by 
consumers and consequently the innovator’s incentive to introduce the new technology. 
  Analytical results show that the market and welfare effects of the introduction of 
GURTs depend on the level of consumer aversion to interventions in the production 
process, the production shares of GM and GURTs products in the total production of the 
non-labeled product, the price of the GM seed after the GURTs product is introduced, the 
price of the GURTs seed, the agronomic characteristics of the GURTs seed over the GM 
seed, and the expected penalty producers face when they cheat on their GM licensing 
agreements.  
Specifically, when the GURTs and the GM product production shares in the total 
production of the non-labeled product stay the same or increase, compared to the GM 
share under the status quo, the price of the non-labeled product decreases. Under this 
case, the lower is the price of the non-labeled product, the more likely it is that the 
introduction of GURTs will lead to welfare gains for consumers with low levels of  
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aversion to genetic modification and the lower are the welfare losses for consumers with 
high levels of aversion to genetic modification. For producers with low dependency on 
saving seed the adoption of the relatively more cost efficient GURTs product will more 
likely lead to welfare gains despite the decrease in the price of the non-labeled product.  
When the GURTs and the GM product production shares in the total production of 
the non-labeled product decrease, compared to the GM share under the status quo, the 
price of the non-labeled product increases. This case emerges only when the monopolist 
increases the price of the GM seed after the GURTs product is introduced.  Under this 
case, the higher is the price of the non-labeled product, the more likely it is that the 
introduction of GURTs will lead to welfare losses for consumers with low levels of 
aversion to genetic modification while consumers with high levels of aversion to genetic 
modification might experience welfare gains (since the likelihood that the non-labeled 
product is GM or GURTs is smaller under this case). The increase in the price of the non-
labeled product leads to welfare gains for producers with high dependency on saving seed 
while producers with low dependency on saving seed might experience welfare losses 
due to the increased price of the GM seed. 
The results also show that, the greater are the agronomic benefits of the GURTs 
crop and/or the lower is the price of the GURTs seed, the more likely it is that producers 
with relatively low dependency on saving seed will find it optimal to switch their 
production from the conventional and the GM crop to the GURTs crop, and, thus, the 
more likely it is that the producers with both low and high dependency on saving seed 
will experience welfare gains.  
Finally, the results show that, the lower is consumer aversion to genetic  
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modification and the lower is the expected penalty producers face when they cheat on 
their GM licensing agreements, the greater is the incentive of the seed company to 
introduce the GURTs technology as the greater are the profits that can be captured by the 
innovating firm. 
  Overall, the results show that the introduction of GURTs may be welfare-
enhancing for all interested groups (consumers, producers and the innovating firm),when 
consumer aversion to GURTs is relatively low, the agronomic benefits of the GURTs crop 
are high, and the expected penalty producers face when they cheat on their GM licensing 
agreements is low.  
The above analysis was conducted for a market where there is no mandatory 
labeling policy (e.g., US market) and under the assumption that a single firm produces 
the GM seed and develops and introduces the GURTs technology in the market. The 
framework developed in this study could be extended to examine the market and welfare 
effects of the introduction of GURTs in countries with labeling regimes, i.e., the EU. The 
single innovating firm assumption could also be relaxed to examine the market and 
welfare effects of GURTs in a market where a small number of seed companies produce 
and introduce the GURTs technology in the market. The examination of the above issues 
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